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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
of a co-defendant against the plaintiff.10s However, it was held that
D-3 and D-4 were aggrieved parties and did have standing to ques-
tion the merits of the affirmative defense because:
1. A holding that the defense is valid, as a matter of law, would
mean that D-i and D-2 were free from negligence, and, there-
fore, D-3 and D-4 alone were negligent.
2. Such a holding might be detrimental to plaintiff, depending on
his injuries, the financial standing of D-3 and D-4, and the
extent of their insurance coverage. Thus, the motion to strike
out the defense was granted.
As additional authority, the court cited the holdings in Glaser
and Bartalone v. Niagara Car & Truck Rentals, Inc.,10 9 for the
proposition that res judicata is not a valid defense. Thus, a con-
flict has developed with the first department's recent holding that
Glaser no longer has any precedential value and can no longer be
followed.110
Collateral Estoppel: DeWitt principle held inapplicable in driver-
passenger situation.
In B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall,"" the Court of Appeals posited
two requirements for the offensive utilization of collateral estoppel.
First, it must be unquestioned that the initial action has been
vigorously defended and second, the later cause of action must be
derivative of the first."'
While the derivative relationship necessary for use of the
doctrine was not defined by the Court, the editors of the Survey
have assumed that the owner-operator relationship was intended.n"
10s See generally 7 WEINsmN, Kom & Miuzm, Nav YoRx CiVil. PRAc-
TicE %5511.08 (1966).109 29 App. Div. 2d 689, 288 N.Y.S.2d 312 (2d Dep't 1968). For a fur-
ther discussion of this case, see The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice,
43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 302, 334 (1968).
110 Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 30 App. Div. 2d 193, 291 N.Y.S.2d
151 (1st Dep't 1968).
111 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
2l2The DeWitt holding, its requirements, and its effect on litigation is
discussed in The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 128, 150 (1967); 43 ST. JOHN'S L. Rxv. 436, 463 (1968); 43 ST.
JOHN'S L REv. 302, 336 (1968). See also 5 WmNsmn= , KoRN & MI.LR,
NEw YoRK Civn. PRAc'ncE 5011.27 (1967).113 Case law, however, manifests a conflict as to what relationship is
requisite to a "derivative" action. Compare Cobbs v. Thomas, 55 Misc. 2d
800, 286 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1968) (discussed in
The Quarterly Survey of New York*Practice, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 302,
336-38 (1968)) with, Quick v. O'Connell, 53 Misc. 2d 1091, 281 N.Y.S.2d 120
(Sup. Ct. Jefferson County 1967). (Criticized in The Qucarterly Survey of
New York Practice, 42 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 436, 463-64 (1968)).
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
To hold that a driver-passenger relationship between initial and
succeeding plaintiffs satisfies the "derivative" requirement of DeWitt
would be to extend offensive collateral estoppel to the hypothetical
train-wreck situation.'1 4
In a recent case, Cantaioni v. Caruso,1" 5 the owner and opera-
tor of car 1 had been successful in a negligence action against the
owner of car 2. Plaintiffs, passengers in car 1, then sought sum-
mary judgment in a personal injury action against the owner of
car 2, relying on DeWitt.
It was held that the plaintiffs (passengers) do not derive their
right to recovery in the sense that DeWitt (owner) derived his right
to recovery from his driver. Moreover, under the DeWitt test, a
paramount question continues to be whether the issues are identical,
and whether they have been actually litigated and determined in
the prior action. Here, neither movants' affidavits nor the record
presented, showed what issues were tried or on what cause of
action the prior judgment was granted. To that extent, movants
did not sustain their burden of establishing an identity of issues.
ARTICLE 34- CALENDAR PRAcTicE; TRIAL PREFERENcEs
CPLR 3403.: Court adds new criterion for determining whether a
special trial preference should be granted.
CPLR 3403(a) provides:
Civil cases shall be tried in the order in which notes of issue have
been filed, but the following shall be entitled to a preference ...
3. An action in which the interests of justice will be served by an
early trial."26
It is now well-settled that the mere old age of a plaintiff will
not warrant the granting of a trial preference." 7  Moreover, where
114 One hundred passengers are injured in a train wreck. The first fifty
to institute suits are unsuccessful. The fifty-first (possibly an infant) recov-
ers judgment. The remaining passengers could recover on the basis of the
fifty-first suit, while the defendant could not take advantage of the fifty
adjudications of its innocence. See Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel:
Limits of the Bernard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957); The Quarterly
Survey of New York Practice, 43 ST. JoHI, 's L. Rmv. 302, 336 (1968).
11557 Misc. 2d 107, 290 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1968).
110 The trial preference available under this Rule, should be distinguished
from the "preferences" available under the rules in the first and second
departments; e.g., Rule IX, Rules for New York and Bronx County Supreme
Court. The local rule merely entitles plaintiff to stay on the general calen-
dar, rather than being placed on the deferred calendar. Where a trial pref-
erence is granted under Rule 3404, however, the case will generally be
advanced to the ready calendar. See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3403, supp.
commentary 13, 14 (1964).
17 Bitterman v. 2007 Davidson Ave., 278 App. Div. 759, 104 N.Y.S.2d 81
(1st Dep't 1951).
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